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The effect of organizational structure on performance is studied 
using a project selection framework in which heterogeneous, ra­
tional agents can reject or accept projects. Using the expected 
profits on accepted projects as a criterion, I determine the optimal 
ordering of agents within a given structure, and compare the per­
formance of different structures. I discuss as well the performance 
from a welfare point of view, and from an informational point of 
view.
Keywords: Organizational Structure. Project Selection. Organizational 
Performance
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1 In tro d u ctio n
That the internal structure of an organization affects its performance has 
been widely recognized. Chandler (1966) notes that the success of the 
multidivisional form was due to the seperation of operational and strate­
gic decisions. He claimed that the organizational structure reflected the 
chosen corporate strategy, or, in his well- known phrase, that, "Structure 
follows Strategy”. His ideas led to a rich literature on the relationship bet­
ween strategy and structure (see Caves (1980) and the references therein). 
There has, however, always been support for the opposite claim as well. 
That “Strategy follows Structure” has recently been put forward by, for 
example, Hammond (1994). He shows how the organizational structure 
influences the gathering and processing of information, and how the decisi­
ons taken at various levels interact to form the organizational choice. The 
organizational strucure screens or filters decision relevant information. In 
short, he shows how the structure of an organization sets its strategic 
decision-making agenda.
The relationship between, on the one hand, the way decentralized 
information is processed and communicated, the ordering in which decisi­
ons are taken, and, on the other hand, the choice and performance of an 
organization is an underdeveloped part of the theory of the firm.
This paper addresses these issues using the framework of the project 
selection model introduced by Sah and Stiglitz ((1985), (1986), (1988)). 
An organization consists of heterogeneous, rational agents w'ho, given the 
limited information they possess, maximize the expected pay-off of the 
organization. Agents evaluate projects their organization may implement. 
Projects can either be good or bad. Good projects, once implemented by 
the organization give rise to a profit, while the organization incurs a loss on 
bad, accepted projects. Agents can either accept or reject a project. The 
structure of an organization fixes the sequence in which agents decide (who 
is first, who is next?), and the situation in which they decide (does an agent 
decide irrespective of the preceeding agents' decisions, or only if a specific 
series of decisions has already been taken?). An agent has knowledge 



























































































and this information cannot lie communicated. Their decisions, though, 
partly reveal the information on which the decision is based. Since agents 
are rational their actions reflect the structure of the organization and the 
uncertainty ensuing from the privacy of information. Agents learn from 
the preceeding agents' decisions. Arguably, differences in organizational 
structure may lead to differences in actions taken.
I compare four simple archetypical organizational forms that are used 
throughout the business community to appraise the value of projects. Tin1 
simplest is a single agent “organization”: if this agent decides to accept 
a project, the organization accepts it, while if it rejects the project the 
organization rejects it. Secondly, a hierarchy. In this structure, if the 
first agent rejects a project it is rejected by the organization, while if it 
is accepted by the first agent it moves on to the second agent. Whether 
the organization will then implement the project depends on this agent's 
decision: acceptance by the second agent implies acceptance by the orga­
nization, and rejection by this agent leads to rejection by the organization. 
In a polyarchy, projects accepted by the first agent will be implemented 
by the organization, while those projects he rejects find their way to the 
second agent’s desk. Whether the organization implements the projects 
then depends on the second agent’s decision, just as in a hierarchy. In an 
omniarchy, finally, whatever the first agent’s decision, the second agent 
considers the quality of the project as well. If the latter decides to accept 
the project, the organization accepts it, while rejection on the organiza­
tional level follows rejection by the second agent.
Projects are characterized by a profit or a loss that is made if ac­
cepted. Agents are defined in terms of an interval in which the value they 
attribute to a project lies. Agents may have intervals of differing lengths.
I address four questions:
• How do changes in the values of a parameters characterizing projects 
and agents affect the performance of a given organizational form? •
• If agents are heterogeneous does their ordering matter? If so. what 



























































































What is the type of information needed to determine the optimal 
ordering?
• For given values of the parameters what organizational form maxi­
mizes the expected pay-off?
• For given values of the parameters what organizational form maxi­
mizes the difference between, on the one hand, the expected value of 
accepted, good projects, and, on the other hand, the expected value 
of accepted, but bad projects and rejected, but good projects?
Let me point out two major differences with the framework used by 
Sah and Stiglitz.
They model agents as fallible human beings, fallible in the sense 
that they make errors when evaluating the value of projects: agents are 
parametrized by a probability of rejecting good projects and a probability 
of accepting bad projects. That is, these probabilities are independent 
of both the organizational architecture and the agent’s position within a 
given structure. Nor are they affected by the decisions other agents take. 
Differences in organizational architectures entail differences in the way 
these exogenously determined individual errors are aggregated, and their 
goal is to relate the best organizational form to the type of environment.
In my model the decision to accept or reject a project, and hence 
implicitly the probability that an agent accepts or rejects a project, reflects 
the overall structure of the organization, the agent’s position within a 
given structure, and the characteristics of both the pool of projects and all 
the agents populating the organization. That is, individual probabilities 
determine and are determined by the overall organizational structure.
Consequently, in the Sail and Stiglitz framework, an omniarchy. i.e.. 
the organizational structure in which, whatever the first agent's decision, 
a second agent evaluates the project, performs as well as a single agent 
organization consisting of the second agent only. In the set up studied 
here, however, the first agent has the information generating role of se- 
perating apparently good from apparently bad projects which allows the 




























































































for bad projects. Thus, an omniarchy may perform better than a single 
agent.
The second difference with the Sail and Stiglitz papers is that I 
compare different organizational architectures not only in terms of the 
expected profits each generates, but as well taking into account the value 
of good projects that organizations reject. This entails an ordering of 
organizational forms which is rather different from the one implied by the 
standard of expected profits.
I show that, in terms of expected profits, an omniarchy, characterized 
by a double check on every project, performs uniformly the best, while a 
single agent organization is always performing the worst. The ordering of 
the polyarchy and the hierarchy, two organizational forms allowing for a 
second instance of screening conditional on the preceeding decision and on 
the basis of independent information depends on both the characteristics 
of the agents and on the type of environment. If agents are different but 
the possible losses A'2 are as large as the possible gains A',, the polyarchy 
and the hierarchy are performing equally well, whereas in the case of 
identical agents the hierarchy performs better than the polyarchy in tough 
environments. The opposite holds for relatively friendly environments.
If, on the other hand the value of rejected but good projects is taken 
into account, the omniarchy stills performs better than any other organi­
zational form. Interestingly, if agents are different but possible gains are 
as large as possible losses, the polyarchy performs uniformly better than 
both the hierarchy and the single agent organization. Indeed, the hierar­
chy may perform even worse than a single agent organization. If agents 
are identical, the polyarchy now performs better than the hierarchy for a 
set of parameters that is larger than when the standard of expected profits 
is used.
The paper shows that in order for the omniarchy to maximize per­
formance the ordering of heterogeneous agents is crucial. Indeed, misallo- 
cating agents in this organizational form gives rise to an expected pay-off 
that is lower than the pay-off obtained in the polyarchy and the hieriar- 
chy. Since the maximization of expected profits in these organizational 





























































































In the next section I discuss the modelling assumptions I use throug­
hout the paper. The succeeding sections address the above mentioned 
questions related to a specific organizational structure: section 3 analyses 
the single agent case, section 4 deals with the hierarchy, section 5 turns to 
polyarchies, while section 6 discusses omniarchies. Section 7 compares the 
performance of the four organizational architectures. Related literature is 
discussed in section 8. Section 9 concludes. Proofs can be found in the 
Appendix.
2 T h e M od el
As noted in the introduction, the model used in this paper is a variant of 
the project selection model studied by Sah and Stiglitz ((1985), (1986). 
and (1988)). Analysis is limited to organizations in which at most two 
agents decide on the project’s future. I study four different structures 
used to select projects: a single agent organization (5), a hierarchy (H). 
a polyarchy (P), and an omniarchy (O). Let me denote an organizational 
form by F, where F £ {S. H. P.O). They are graphically represented in 
figure 1.
The nodes represent agents, an arrow indicates the flow of projects 
within the organization, while the labels on the arcs stand for the decision 
agents take: .4 stands for Acceptance, while R stands for Rejection. These 
are the only actions agents can take. From a theoretical point of view, 
the limitation to a binary action set may seem a strong assumption: as a 
characterization of real world approval systems, it seems to be acceptable. 
In a hierarchy, a project is accepted if and only if every manager appro­
ves the project; inspection stops as soon as bad review is received. In a 
polyarchy, a project is rejected if and only if every manager rejects the 
project; inspection stops when a good review is recieved. In an omniarchy. 
whatever Mr. i ’s decision, the project is looked at as well from Ms. j  's 
perspective. The single agent "organization” has a straightforward inter­


































































































Figure 1: The four organizational forms studied
first to decide, and Ms. j  the second. In particular, S(i) := S(i,j)  stands 
for the single agent organization consisting of Mr. i only.
Mr. i and Ms. j  are team-member in the sense of Marschak and Rad- 
ner (1972): given the information agents have they undertake that course 
of action that maximizes the expected pay -off of the organization as a 
whole. This implies the absence of any principal agent problem.
Every project the organization considers is characterized by the tu­
ple (9t,9:>,V). 9l can be interpreted as a signal Mr. i obtains, or as a 
value he atributes to the project. Similarily, is the signal or valuation 
of Ms. j  . These signals are private and cannot be communicated. The 
lack of communication reflect high communcication costs due to, for ex­
ample high costs of processing, transmitting, and interpreting specialized 
information. V, finally, is the value of a project if it is implemented. 
Neither Mr. i nor Ms. j  observe V. An interpretation of this characte­
rization would be to consider Mr. i and Ms. j as operating in different 
departments, having different competences. Note that this not imply that 
analysis is restricted to organizations that have at most two agents. In 




























































































pable of solving: engineers decide on the technical feasability of. say. a 
new product, while the marketing department contemplates the marketa­
bility of the product . Projects or problems of a merely technical character 
will not pass through the latter department. Hence, the real limitation 
resides in the assumption that just two aspects of a project determine 
its profitability. The impossibility to communicate the value of 9' and 9: 
could reflect the high degree of specialization that is concomitant to the 
organization's divisional structure.
The characteristics (9‘, 9J) of the projects the enterprise considers 
are randomly drawn from two independent uniform distributions:
B‘ ~U[-6.B]
0j u [-e  -  h, 9 +  h] [ '
where 6 > 0 and h > —9. The random variables have the same expec­
ted value, E(9‘) =  E(0i) =  0. but they may have different variances: 
Var{8]) > Var(9‘) if and only if h > 0. The value V of an implemented 
project depends on the sum of the values of the individual characteristics:
V = 8‘ + 9i > 0 8' + 9J < 0 ( 2 )
where A”,- > 0 for i = 1,2. This specification implies that what a project 
lacks in terms of, say, marketability may be made up by its ease and 
efficiency in production. It ensures as well that an accepted project that 
is profitable gives rise to a pay-off that is independent of the particular 
values of #‘and 9K The size of the pool of projects is irrelevant to what 
follows, and can be set equal to one. Given the set- up, ex ante half of the 
projects is good, while the other half is bad.
Assumption 1 specifies those elements that are common knowledge.
Assumption 1 The organizational form, the distribution of9‘and of 8J. 
the specification o fV , as well as the rationality of the agents is common 
knowledge. Moreover, if agent i's decision preceedes j  s decision, the for­



























































































An agent is rational in the sense that based on the information it has it 
takes whatever action gives rise to the highest expected pay-off. If an 
agent is indifferent it decides to reject the project. Given assumption 1. 
an agent’s decision reflects the organizational structure, the distributions 
of the signals, and the rationality. This contrasts sharply with the actions 
taken by the agents that populate the organizations of Sah and Stiglitz. 
In the framework they use, an agent is characterized by its probability 
of accepting profitable projects and its probability of accepting inefficient 
projects. These probabilities are independent of both the organizational 
architecture and the agent’s position within a given structure. Nor are 
they affected by the decisions other agents take. One could say that the 
agents in Sah and Stiglitz are individualistic, in that they do things by 
themselves, ignoring others, and in their own way, while the ones I model 
are organizational, in the sense that their actions reflects the presence of 
other agents and the organizational structure in which their actions are 
embedded.
A central feature of the optimal decision rules for both agents is the 
presence of a threshold value: for values of the signal larger than this thres­
hold projects will be accepted by an agent, while for values smaller than or 
equal to this cut-off value projects will be rejected1. Throughout the pa­
per, ECn.\F(i, j)) denotes the expected profits made on accepted projects 
in organization F (i,j), and T'jlllF) := max(E(H\F(i,j)).E(H\F(j,i))). 
That is, the former expression denotes the expected profits of given orga­
nizational structure with given ordering of agents, while the latter stands 
for the expected profits of an organizational form which has arranged its 
agents in the best way.
Now I can restate the four questions mentioned in the introduction.
• How does the expected value of accepted projects, i?(n|F(i, j)) of
an organizational form F respond to changes in the parameters
(0,h,Xu X 2)1
• If the variances of the valuations are different for the agents, who
11 show in section 6.1 that there exist organizations as well in which projects are 




























































































should be the first to evaluate a project? Does the ordering depend 
on flu* sign of li only, or does the value of h matter as well?
• Given values of (B,h.Xi,X-i) which organizational form F maximi­
zes the expected pay off F (n |F)?
• Given values of (B.h. A’i , A’2) which organizational form F maximi­
zes the difference between, on the one hand, the expected value of 
accepted, good projects, and. on the other hand, the expected value 
of accepted bad projects and rejected, but good projects?
3 T h e S ingle A gen t C ase
Before discussing organizations in senso stricto, I analyse the behaviour 
of a single agent whose expected pay-off is determined by the sum of the 
signals O' + 6h as specified in equation (2). I show that the agent with the 
largest variance ensures the highest pay-off, and derive the expression for 
expected profits F  (n | S'). as well as two comparative statics results.
Suppose Mr. i operates on his own. He accepts all projects cha­
racterized by a signal or valuation B‘ where O' satisfies AS Pr(#‘ + B1 > 
0) -  X-i Prf#1 + 6-i < 0) > 0. Given Mr. i ‘s knowledge of the distribution 
of (P , he accepts all those projects that he considers sufficiently good. 
That is, all those projects characterized by O' > 0\ where the threshold 
value 6‘ solves AS Pr(#‘ + Bi > 0) — A'2 Pr(0* + < 0) = 0. Hence, Mr. i
accepts all those projects with a valuation larger than B‘ , where B‘ equals
w = (3)
where k A’̂ /A'i. k is an important parameter in this model, and it 
should be noted that for finite and positive values of A’i and A2. 0 < k < 
oo. The higher the value of k the higher the loss A\  relative to A"). That 
is, the higher k the tougher the environment. The value of B‘ may be larger 
than B . in which case Mr. i rejects all projects; or it may be smaller than 




























































































of the project determines the project's future. Clearly, the values 9 and 
9 divide the range of possible threshold values in three areas, each with 
a corresponding type of decision, namely reject irrespective of valuation, 
accept irrespective of valuation, and finally decision depends on valuation. 
I call these types of decisions qualitatively different.
Lemma 1 The threshold value 9 is larger than 9 if and only if
h 2_ > —  and > 1
The threshold value 9‘ is smaller than -9 if and only if 
h 2k_ > _ _ _  aad ,. < 1
For all other values of (9,h,k) the threshold value 0‘ E (—9,9).
(4)
( o )
The same kind of analysis applies in case of Ms. j  being on her own. She 
accepts all those projects satisfying 9J > 9J. where 9J equals
9j = 9k -  1
k + 1 ( 0 )
Lemma 2 specifies when Ms. j  accepts or rejects all projects, and when 
her decision depends on the project’s valuation.
Lemma 2 The threshold value 0: is larger than 0 + h if and. only if
l  ~  and t  >  1 (7)
The threshold value 91 is smaller than —9 — h if and only if 
h 2k-  < t -  - and k < 1 (8)
f7 f t  T  1





























































































Figure 2: Profits and Losses in a Single Agent Organization
These lemmas show that the type of decision depends on the interplay of 
the three main parameters of the model, but, interestingly enough, in a 
special way as both h/0 and k = A^/A'i are ratios, the first capturing the 
diversity of the agents, and the second the diversity of the value of projects. 
Figure 2 illustrates the areas where good and bad projects are accepted 
when Ms. j  forms organization. The area enclosed by the lines = 0J. 
9‘ = —0. = 0 + h , and 0l = 0 contains all the projects with values (0‘, O')
that Ms.j accepts if the parameter values equal (0,h,k) satisfying the 
third restriction of lemma 2. The lightgrey area above the line 9‘ + 0J = 0 
represents the area for which a profit will be made, while the grey area 
below and on the line 0l + 0i = 0 lead to a loss. Proposition 1 summarizes 




























































































Proposition  1 .&(n|S(f)) equals
(2 e - h k  + h)2 
X l 89(9 + h)(k + 1)
A'i-
A'1;
1 -  k
9
9 - h k
2(9 (k + 1)) 
while ^(nlSQ)) amounts to
v  (29 + h(k + l))2
Ai;89(6 + h)(k + 1)
AY
1 -  k
Ai 0 +  A(* + l) 
2(9 + h)(k + l)
k > 1. h G 0. -9 2k' k - \
k <1 .  h e  ( 0.#
lfc-1
fc > 1. h > 6
k < \ h >  - 9
h < 0
k -  1
2 k
k -  1
h > 0
k > 1, h < - 9  




k < 1, h € ( .0 j . or
A- 1/ lG i _ ^ T T ° :
Clearly, if an agent accepts no project at all, the expected pay-off equals 
zero, while if an agent accepts all projects, expected pay-off equals A'j (1 — 
k) /2, which is strictly positive since k < 1 if an agent accepts all projects. 
Proposition 2 shows that the agent with the largest variability in his eva­
luations makes the highest profit.
Proposition 2 In the single agent case, the agent with the largest va­
riance ensures the highest profit: £’(I1|S(/')) > £(II|5(j)) •$=> h < 0. 
Therefore
E(U\S)  =
9 -  hk
X l 29(k + l)
(29 + h(k + 1 ) )2
l 89(9 + h)(k + \)






























































































The intuition for this result is that the agent knows its own valuation 
when deciding, and. in order to maximize expected pay -offs, it prefers 
a variable with a small variance to one with a high variance. Hence, 
the agent with the largest variance should form the organization. The 
following comparative statics results involving changes in the environment 
or changes in the agents’ characteristics hold for such optimal single agent 
organizations. From equation 6 and figure 2 it can be seen that increasing 
the value of k (keeping A'i fixed) has two opposing effects. First of all. it 
leads to an increase in the loss made in the area below the O' + 0 = 0  line. 
Secondly, it shifts up the threshold value W , which implies two opposing 
effects. On the one hand, this reduces the size of the surface where a loss 
is made, but on the other hand, it reduces as well the size of the area 
where a profit is made. Corollary 1 shows the net effect of an increase in 
k.




( 1 0 )
The expected profits of an optimal single agent organization grows with 
any increase in \h\:
dE(U\S:h > 0)
dh > (ID
chEXnlS;/! < 0) 1 '
dh <
This corollary shows first of all that an increasingly thougher project en­
vironment leads to a decrease in expected profits. It shows as well that 
any increase in the degree of heterogeneity of the agents raises the expec­
ted profits. This can be understood by looking at figure 2. Given that 
h > 0, Ms. j  will be in the organization. Her threshold value 0J can be 
either positive or negative, but in any event it falls within the interval 
(—0,0). Therefore, any increase in h increases the size of the area where 
a profit is made, while leaving the surface of the area where a loss is made 




























































































4 H ierarch ies
This section studies the behaviour of Mr. i and Ms. j  in a hierarchy. Mr. /
, who is the first to look at a project, accepts a project if and only if 
the expected value of an accepted project is larger than the expected 
value of a rejected project. Rejection of a project leads to zero profits for 
sure. Hence, i accepts the project if its expected value is positive. The 
expected pay-off is not only determined by i's signal, but as well by j  s 
signal. Although Mr. i does not know the value of 9J. lie does know that 
j  takes that action that maximizes expected value. Given that rejection 
by j  leads to zero profits with certainty, j  accepts whatever project will 
lead to an expected positive pay- off. Moreover, when j  decides, she knows 
that i decided favourably on the project. Let me assume that i's decision 
rule is of the type Accept if and only if O' > 0‘ and Reject if and only if 
9‘ < 9‘. Then, it can be shown that there exists a threshold value 93 such 
that j  accepts if and only if 9J > 03 and rejects if and only if 9J < 9J. 
Moreover, given this cut-off rule used by j,  i's best response is to apply a 
cut-off rule as well. In other words, the use of a cut-off rule by both Mr. i 
and Ms. j  is consistent.
Let me therefore assume that i uses a cut -off rule. If j  has to decide 
she knows that 9l > 0‘ and hence accepts all projects with a value 9J that 
satisfies
A', Pr(<9- + 0> > 0| 9{ > W) -  X 2 < 0| 9‘ > W) > 0 (12)
It is straightforward to see that Ms. j  's threshold value 9J satisfies
A'i Pr(0‘ + O3 > 0| 9l > f )  -  X 2 Pr(6>‘ + W < 0| 9' > 9*) = 0 (13)
and j  accepts all those projects such that, 9> > 9J. This shows that 03 is 
a function of 9‘. This function can be considered Ms. j  's best response 
function. If 0‘ > 9, Mr. i rejects all projects, and Ms. j never receives a 
project. Her threshold value 93 can therefore take on any value. If. on 
the other hand, W < —9. Mr. i accepts all projects. Ms.j's response to 




























































































equation (13) amounts to
A’i
r0 dx
L w j Z f
dx
o - o '
0 + eJ -o ’ -  o'
1 -----rj — A 2------r7-  —
0 - 0  0 - 0
Therefore, 0J(0‘) equals
( — OC,  0 0  +  1)
- ^*+T -
f  > 0 




Let me now turn to Mr. i . For a project to which he assigns a value of 6‘ 
the expected pay -off equals the probability that j  accepts a project that 
has been accepted by i times the expected value of such a project:
Pr(0> > 0J) (A'i Pr(0!' + 0> > 0| 0J > O1) -  X 2 Pr(0‘ + Oj < 0| 0> > 0j ))
Consequently, i accepts those projects with a value 0‘ > O', where 0' solves
Pr(0J > Oj ) (.Yj Pr (O' + Oj > 0|6»J > Oj ) -  X 2 Pt(S‘ + O1 < O|0J' > Oj )) = 0
(16)
Suppose 0J > 0 + h. meaning that Ms . j  rejects all projects that Mr. i 
accepts. As a consequence, Mr. i is indifferent between acceptance and 
rejection, and therefore rejects all projects, or O' > 0. If, on the other hand, 
0J < —0 — li, Ms. j  accepts all projects, and Mr. i ’s behaviour in case of 
O' < — 0 — li is the same as in case of 0̂  = — 0 — h. For 6 [—0 — h.O + h) 
ecpiation (16) becomes
0 + h - 0 j (  0 + h + 0‘ _ - 0 ‘ -  Oj \  =
2(0 + h) \  l fj + h - 0 J ' 20 + h - 0 j )
This amounts to
0j > 0 + h 
0J G (-O -h .O  + h) 
ej < ~ o ~ h
0‘(0J -V J Z i - V  + V i b  






























































































Figure 3: The best replies of i and j  in a hierarchy
Equations (15) and (18) jointly determine the mutually consistent va­
lues of 6‘ and d3. They are graphically represented in figure 3. This 
graph implicitly assumes that h > 0, i.e., the situation where Ms. j  's 
valuations have the highest variance. Figures 3 shows first of all that 
(9‘ ,9J) 6 (9, esc) x (0 + h. oo) are consistent threshold values. Since these 
threshold levels are independent of the parameter k that characterizes the 
environment they do not interest me here. For these threshold values the 
organizational pay-off is equal to zero.
Secondly, the figure shows that for h > 0 the intersection of the 
best response functions is always to the right of the line 0‘ — 9 and in 
between the lines 93 = 9 + h and 93 = —9 — h. Hence, if h > 0. i.e.. if 
Ms. j  has the higher variance, her cut-off value falls within the interval 
(—9 — h,0 +  /(). Hence, her decision depends on the signal she receives. 
Whether the threshold value 9' of Mr. i falls within the interval (—0.9) 
depends on the position of the intersection of the best response functions 
9‘(93) and 9J (9‘). The following lemma specifies the conditions under 
which Mr. i ’s decision is affected by the signal he obtains. It tells as well 




























































































receives in case h < 0.
Lemma 3 The threshold value 0‘ is smaller than 0 . It is smaller than 
or equal to —0 if and only if
h 2k 
~9 -  k +1 (19)
The threshold value 01 is smaller than 0 + h . 
to — 0 — h if and only if
h 2k 
9 ~ ~ 3k + 1
It is smaller than or equal
( 2 0 )
Two observations are in order. First of all, the fact that W < 0 and that 
91 < 9 + h shows that the mere introduction of a second agent evaluating 
the projects excludes the possibility that an agent rejects all projects. 
Remember that in the single agent case Mr. i rejects all projects if k > 1 
and h is sufficiently positive, while Ms. j  rejects for k > 1 and h sufficiently 
negative. Secondly, note that it is impossible that both agents accept all 
projects irrespective of their valuations. The precise values for 9 and 91 
that satisfy equations (15) and (18) are given in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The following threshold values for agent i and j  are con­
sistent:
9 '= (9  + h ) ^
?  =




9J < -9  -  h
= - f F T T
9J > 9 + h
- 0 < h  < - 9 & Î
û  2 k 
Zk+ l
V(0, h, k)
( 2 1 )
The expected profit E{H\H(i, j)) can now be calculated, ft equals





























































































Figure 4: Profits and Losses in a Hierarchy
where = {(9i,9>)\9i G (9\9}, 9> G (9J,9 + h}}. Figure 4 illustrates 
this expression.
The graph has been drawn under the assumption that ()' G [—0.0) 
and G (—9 + h,9 + h), and. in particular h G (92k/(k + 1)). The 
area enclosed by the lines 9‘ = 0\ 9-> =  9 + h, and 9‘ = 9
contains all the projects with values (9‘, 9J) that a hierarchy accepts if the 
parameter values equal (9, h, k), and satisfy the just mentioned restriction. 
The lightgrey area above the line 9‘ + 9^—0 represents the area for which 
a profit will be made, while the grey area below and on the line 9' +9j = 0 
lead to a loss.
Proposition 4 The expected profit of a hierarchy E(H\H(i.j)) equals
e - h k  
X l26(k + 1)
(1 + k)(29 + h f
l 89(9 + h)(2k + l) 
9 +  h(k + 1)
2(9 + h)(k + 1 )
2k
—9 < h < ~Uu  + l
- 9 ^ -  <  h < 9 ^ -





























































































Note that for both h 6 (—9. —9 2k/(3k + 1)) and for h > 92k/(k + 1). 
the hierarchy consists of just one agent who evaluates "actively" projects: 
the other merely accepts all projects that arrive at its desk. It would be 
a mistake, though, to say that therefore the hierarchy turns into a single 
agent organization, since the precise parameter values for which just one 
agent is "active”, and for which the other agent accepts all projects, does 
depend on the overall organizational structure.
The expressions for expected profits given above allow me to analyse 
an important issue, namely, the optimal ordering of agents with given cha­
racteristics within the hierarchy. Mr. i . who is characterized by valuations 
ranging from -9 to 9 , should he be the first to evaluate a project or the se­
cond given that Ms. j  's valuations belong to the interval [—9 — h. 9 + h]? 
The expressions I obtained until now are based on the assumption that 
Mr. i is the first to decide. Making Ms. j  the first to consider projects sim­
ply means rewriting the above expressions, in particular the ones stating 
the expected profits, where 9 should be replaced by 9' := 9 + h , and h 
replaced by h' := —h. The following proposition can be shown to hold.
Proposition 5 Tht ordering of heterogeneous agents does not affect the 
expected pay -off of a hierarchy.
An important consequence of this result is that no knowledge regarding 
the agents’ characteristics is required to find the optimal positioning of 
agents within a hierarchy. In other words, informational requirements in 
order to find the optimal ordering of a given pair of agents in a hierarchy 
are absent.
This result reflects the symmetry of the organizational maximization 
problem. Although Mr. i s and Ms. j 's decision problems have been 
formulated in terms of finding a cut off rule, they are equivalent to a 
single maximization problem; the best response functions 9‘(9J) and 9J(9‘) 
can be obtained as the first order conditions ensuing from a maximization 
of equation 22 with respect to 9‘ and 9J , respectively. This problem is 
clearly symmetric in the agents' positions.
Just as the section on the single agent organization, this section 




























































































Corollary 2 An increase in k leads to an decrease in the expected profits 
a hierarchy obtains, whatever the value of (0, h).
dE(U\H)
-W ^ <0 <24)
while any increase in the heterogeneity of the agents leads to an increase 
in the expected profits:
dE(H\H;h > 0) Q
dE (U \$ ,h< 0)  (25)
dh < 0
Although the ordering of heterogeneous agents does not determine the 
performance of a hierarchy, the degree of heterogeneity does affect the ex­
pected pay-off. Indeed, the corollary shows that the organization benefits 
from any increase in differences between agents.
5 P olyarchy
In this section I discuss the behaviour and performance of a polyarchy 
in which the same Mr. i and Ms. j  operate within the same project- 
environment as in the last section. Just as in a hierarchy, Mr. i accepts 
a project if and only if the expected pay-off of acceptance is higher than 
the expected pay-off or rejection. The expected pay-off of rejection no 
longer equals zero, but equals the expected pay-off of a project that has 
been rejected by Mr. i but accepted by Ms. j  . When Ms. j  sits down to 
consider a project, she knows that it has been rejected by Mr. i so she 
knows that 9‘ < 6'. Hence, she accepts a project if and only her valuation 
0J > W, where 0J solves
X i Pr(0‘ + O’ > 0| 0l < O') -  A'2 Pr(0‘ +  0J < 0| 0l < f)‘) = 0 (26)
Suppose O' > 0, i.e., Mr. i rejects all projects. Ms. j  ‘s reaction to O' > 0 




























































































all, as all are directly accepted by Mr. i . Hence 0J can be freely chosen. 
Finally, for 0 £ (—0.0). equation 26 can be rewritten as
i ~~— —  - M-------—
0+ 0 0+ 0
Therefore, in a polyarchy 0:(0‘) equals
(28)
Mr. i ’s decision rule can now be stated as follows.
Mr. i accepts if and only if O' satisfies 
A', Pr(<9' + 0j > 0) -  A2 Pr(#' + 0J < 0) >
Pr(6»J > 0j ) (A, Pr(0‘ + 0* > 0| 0j >0j )~  X 2 Pr(0{ + & < 0| 0* > 0j ))
Equations (28) and (29) are drawn in figure 5 for the case where h > 0.
Note that in case of h > 0 the intersection is always to the right of the 
line O' = — 0 and in between the lines 0J = 0 + h and 0J = — 0 — h. Hence. 
Ms. j  ’s action always depends on the signal she receives, while Mr. i ’s 
approval of a project depends on his valuation if and only if the intersection 
falls within the inner rectangular marked by the dotted lines. Lemma 5 
specifies the conditions under which decisions depend on the signals agents 
obtain. Hence, similar to a hierarchy, there are parameter values such 
that decisions are taken irrespective of the agents’ signal. Contrary to a 
hierarchy, however, projects are not unconditionally accepted but possibly
For every value of 0J , lemma 4 states Mr. i ‘s best response 0‘(O1).





























































































Figure 5: The best replies of i and j  in a polyarchy
rejected irrespective of the, possibly high, valuation. The interest of this 
observation is that, although Mr. i can make the organization accept a 
project by accepting it himself, he will never do so independent of his 
private valuation.
Lemma 5 The threshold value 0‘ is larger than -9 . It is larger than or 
equal to 9 if and only if
h 2 
0 ~ k + 1
(30)
The threshold value 9J is larger than —9 — 




It is larger than or equal to
(31)
In other words, the mere introduction of a second agent ensures that nor 
Mr. i nor Ms. j  accepts a project independent of his or her valuation. This 
should be compared to the single agent case in which the whole pool 




























































































ill which projects may get unconditionally accepted, but not rejected. 
Moreover, with increasing A. the area of the parameter space in which 
a project may get accepted by any agent at all shrinks until it becomes 
infinitesimally small for k —> oc.
The threshold values 0‘ and 0J that satisfy equations (28) and (29) 
are given by proposition 6.
Proposition 6 The following threshold values for agent i and j  are con­
sistent:
ï ï= (9  + h ) ^ \A*+l
4- h—i^  n fc+2
eJ > e +  h
. 9‘ >6 & = :
In a polyarchy, pay-offs are determined by the 
Mr. i or Ms. j . That is, E{U\P(i,j)) equals
-9  < h <  -6 T E
< h < e '-àï <32> 
h > ^
projects accepted by either
X i j J  Pr (6‘ + (P > 0)d9id6j -  À'2J j  Pr (0‘ + 0j < 0) d9iddj + (33) 
0',> 0 ),
Af j J  Pr (0l + 9j > 0) cl9‘d0j -  x j j  Pr (6‘ + 0J < 0) d9‘d0J 
0 '/  0 ' /
where 0'P = {(0i,(P)\0i £ (<9*, 6»], (P € [-61 -  h. 9 +  h] }, and Q'f = 
{(9 \0 l)\9 l £ [—9,9‘), 0i £ (9 \9  + h]}. Figure 6 illustrates equation 
(33). The light grey area represents all those (#‘,0J) where a profit is 
made on accepted projects, while the grey indicate the area where a po­
lyarchy incurs a loss. The graph has been drawn under the assumption 
that 0 < h < 9 j ~ .
Proposition 7 The expected profit E(U\P(i, j)) in a polyarchy equals
0 -  hk 
X l 20(k +  l)
v. h2k(k +  l) +  80(9+ h)
" 1 80(0 +  h)(k + 2)
y. 9 +  h ( k +  1 )
. l 2(9+h)(k + l)


































































































Figure 6: Profits and Losses in a Polyarchy
Just as in a hierarchy, the ordering of heterogeneous agents does not affect 
organizational performance.
Proposition 8 The ordering of heterogeneous agents does not affect the 
expected pay- off of a polyarchy.
The intuition is once again the symmetry of the organizational decision 
problem. Note that, in a polyarchy, the organizational decision problem of 
maximizing the value of accepted projects is equivalent to minimizing the 
value of rejected projects. Since the probability that a project is rejected 
is the product of the probability that Mr. i rejects and the probability 
that Ms. j  rejects, the minimization problem is clearly symmetric in the 
positioning of the agents. Hence, the related maximization problem is 
symmetric as well.
Corollary 3 shows that for all parameter values, increasing heteroge­
neity contributes positively to the organization's performance. Moreover, 
it shows that a tougher project selection environment decreases the per­




























































































Corollary 3 Any increase in the heterogeneity of the agents contributes 
positively to the performance of a polyarchy:
OE{U\P: li > 0)





while any increase in the ratio k leads to a decrease in expected profits:
0E(U\P) (36)
6 O m niarchy
The last organizational architecture I discuss is the omniarchy. In this 
organizational structure, whatever Mr. i ’s decision, Ms. j  evaluates the 
project as well. When analyzing a project, she knows the decision Mr. i 
took. Just as in the preceeding sections, Ms. j  ’s decision rule is of the 
threshold type, hut, since the projects that reach her have either been 
rejected or accepted by Mr. i , there is a threshold value for correspon­
ding to either decision. Let W stand for the threshold value in case i 
rejected a project, and let O3' denote the cut-off value if i accepted a 
project. Since the expected profit of a project rejected by j  equals zero, j  
accepts projects with a positive expected pay-off. As a consequence, the 
relationship between O' and 9jA is the same as the relationship between 9‘ 
and 03 in a hierarchy, while the relationship between 0‘ and 93R coincides 
with the relationship between 9' and 9J in case of a polyarchy. They are 




- * * tt + **tt
-O G . OG
9 >9  
9‘ € (-9,9) 
W < -9
9jA(9i) = •
( — OG, OC )
*£tt
9 >9  































































































Intuitively, if Mr. i's threshold level is such that he accepts some projects, 
while he rejects others, then projects that he accepted should meet a less 
severe test on Ms.j's desk than projects that Mr. / has rejected. That is. 
if d‘ £ (—0,0), one would expect 0J>t > 0*A. It is straightforward to show 
that this holds for equations (37) and (38). Mr. / 's decision rule can be 
stated as Accept if and only if 0‘ satisfies
Pr(Qj > 0jA) (Xi  Pr(0‘ + 6> > Q\9> > 0jA) -  X 2 Pv(0‘ +  0J < 0|0> > 0jA)) 
is larger than
Pr(6d > 0jR) (Ad Pr(6>! + & > 0|0̂  > 0jK) -  X 2 Pr(6»* + 0j < 0 | > 0jH)) 
Lemma 6 shows that this decision rule is still of the threshold type.
Lemma 6 The decision rule of agent i takes on the following form.. If 
01 > O', where O' is defined as
V = - & ( V R - W  + h))
Oi =  - ^ - k (0 +  h +  kOj A )
* = - M * R+aiA)
^  =  m  (0 +  h)
WR € (-0 — h,0 + h) and
ejA < -0  -- h:
WR > 0 + h and
WA G (-0 -  h,0 + h):
ejR,ei A e ( -0  -  h.O + h)
ojR > 0)A;
ojR > 0 + h and
ojA < -0 --  ft;
the project will be accepted; all projects are rejected ( i.c.. 0 > 0) if
0jR,0jA >0 + h or
WR,WA < —0 — h or (40)




























































































F in a l ly ,  f o r  9 ' <  9 ‘ . and. f)‘ d e f in e d  a s fo l lo w s
—i W R < —9 —h and9 =  “ T + t  K  - W  +  h)) :
o j A e ( - 9 - h.0 + h):
o j A > 9 + h and
9 ‘ =  ~ i +j;(9 + h  + k9 )  :
V R € ( - 9 - h.9 + h);
-jri i /  ~sij .4 , ~7\j R \ o l R .9JA e ( - - 9 - h . .9 +9 =  - i h ( * + k * ) 9jR < 0 j A :
e j R < - 9 - h and
i
9' = ^ ( 9  + h)
P * > 9 +  h:
(41)
the project is accepted as well.
Although Mr. i still uses a threshold value, it is not necessarily the case 
that only those projects with a sufficiently large value will be accepted. 
Indeed, if WR < 9jA. and W* 6 ( -0  -  h,6 + h) (for x € {A,/?}, then 
Mr. i accepts projects only if their valuations are sufficiently low.
The next step in the analysis is to find the vector of consistent thres­
hold values (S‘,9J ,9jA). Since there are now three values to be determi­
ned, graphical methods, like the ones used in the preceeding sections are 
not very revealing.
Equations (37), (38), and (41) can never lead to a consistent set 
of threshold values, as equations (37) and (38) have been derived on the 
basis of the assumptions that Mr. i accepts if and only if 9‘ > O', while 
the threshold values defined by (41) are such that a project is accepted 
if and only if 0' < O'. In section 6.1, I derive consistent threshold values 
under the assumption that Mr. i accepts if and only if 9‘ < O'. The idea 
is to determine Ms. j  ‘s reaction function 0jR (9‘) and 9jA (O’) under the 
assumption that Mr. i accepts if and only if 9‘ < 9‘.
Note as well that in certain cases an omniarchy turns into a hier­
archy or a polyarchy; if, for example, Ms. j  rejects all projects, whatever 
her valuation, be., if 9J > 9 + h, then a project rejected by Mr. i im­




























































































Ojl< > 9 + h equals a hierarchy. The idea is then to check whether con­
sistent threshold rallies for a hierarchy can be reconciled with 9*" as a 
best response to 0‘ can satisfy 9J (9‘) > 9 + It. In this way. all consistent 
threshold values for 0jR > 9 + h and/or 0jA < —9 — h can be found. The 
remaining cases can then be dealt with by analysing the consistency for 
f  < -9 , 9' 6 (-9,9), and 0' > 9.
Proposition 9 If i accepts if and only if 9‘ > 9‘. and j  accepts if and only 
if 9* > 9JX. where x E {.4. /?}, then the following values are consistent for
{9i,9iIt,9iAY :
((9 + h ) ^ , 9  + h , - 9 - h )
(~^2Ï+I -  hu+î' 6 + h, -Ojil+ï + h2iï+ï) 
(-9 ,9  + h,9 4=1)
( 9 , 9 ^ , 9  + h)
( 9 , 9 ^ , - 9 - h )
+ - h & , - e - h )
(0, 9 & , - 9 & )
I t<i, ft e (-*,-*&) 
l * > ! •  h * ( - e' - 9& i )
^  { - 9 ^ , - 9 ^ )
h > ° &  
h > 0 £ I
{ k < l , h >  - 9 &
\  k > \, h > - 9 &
( k <1, h > - 9 ^
1 k > 1, h > - M t
(42)
Finally, forh > 9 j~ ,  9' > 9 ,f fR — 9jff^, 9}A < —0|j±y is a consistent tri­
ple of cut-off values, whereas for h > 9 j~ ,  a consistent triple of threshold 
values equals 9' < —9 ,f fR > 9 ^ ~ ,  and 93 A = 9jff\ is .
For many parameter values different vectors of threshold values are consi­
stent. Indeed, there are three different ways in which different vectors of 
threshold values can be consistent. The most trivial example is the one 
given in footnote 2; for, say, h > 9-j~, (9,9jff^, —9 — h) is a consistent
2 It should be noted that if (6‘,9jR,8jA) equals, say, 9 — h) this means





























































































threshold value, but so is. for every <q. e2 > 0, (0 + e,. 0~~. —6 — h — c2). 
Mr. i ’s threshold value can be increased by any number without affecting 
in any way Mr. i ’s behaviour and Ms. js  best reply. That W' can be 
decreased holds for the same reason. No change in expected pay off is 
implied.
The second type can be illustrated by, say h > implying that 
0‘ = 0, 01'1 =  0 |^ i. and 0j A < —0|±y is a consistent triple of cut off values. 
Here, can take on any value satisfying 0J"' =  ( — 0 — h ,— 0|Jy]. Note 
once again that such differences are inconsequential as far as individual 
behaviour given the consistent threshold values is concerned; since 8‘ > 0, 
all projects will be rejected, and Ms. j  therefore never applies, as it were._j A
6 . Once again, expected profits are not affected by stich changes.
And finally the third type of multiple consistent threshold values. 
For h > and k > 1, for example, there are four different vec­
tors of consistent threshold values: (—8. 0 + h, —0 — h).
and ( 0 ,0 ^ ,  —0 ^ ) .  Three of these vectors imply beha­
viour that is qualitatively different one from the other, he., behaviour that 
is or is not guided by the signal the agent obtains; in the first case, Mr. i 
accepts all projects, and Ms. j  accepts some of these; in the second and 
third case, Mr. i rejects all projects, while Ms. j  accepts some of these; in 
the fourth case, Mr. i accepts on average one out of two projects, while 
whatever his choice, Ms. j  accepts some and rejects others. Let me call two 
vectors of threshold levels qualitatively different if the implied behaviour 
of the agents is qualitatively different.
Corollary 4 In an omniarchy, for almost every vector of parameters 
(6,h,k) there are at least two qualitatively distinct vectors of consistent 
cut-off values (0\ 0j/?. 8* ' ). The only exception is the vector (9,h.k) =
(0 ,-i0 .1 ).
Qualitatively different consistent threshold values may give rise to diffe­
rences in organizational performance. I now derive expressions for the 




























































































0J. f.V = o'
amounts to
A'i / /  p.«»‘ + 0J > 0) dO‘(l8J - X 2
(~yjAu o
I I  Pr«9' + 0j < 0)dOi(lf)j + (43)
(~yjA




where ©g4 = {{0i,0^)\0i € ( ,̂6>], 0J G ((?A.0 + h\ }. and analogously
= {(6>% 6»>) | (92 G [-0,1?), 0j G 6> -+-/?]}. For t  G (—6»,é>), and 
O3 ,03' G [—0 — h,0 + h). figure 7 represents the accepted, good or had. 
projects.
Because of the abundance of consistent threshold values, I limit at­
tention to two special cases. I either assume that the possible loss on a 
project is as large as its possible profit, be., k = 1, or I assume that Mr. i 
and Ms. j  have the same characteristics, be., h = 0.
First the case where agents are identical, or h = 0. Proposition 9 
shows that there are just two possible vectors of consistent threshold 
values: either (0. or (0, ̂ XT+T* — )• Proposition 10 below




























































































of threshold values dominates for all k and 9 the expected profits of an 
omniarchy applying the former.
Proposition 10 The expected profit of an omniarchy for h — 0 and with 
{ f .W R.WA) = {9. 9 ^ .  9 ^ )  equals
-V, 1
2 A- + 1 (44)
The expected pay-off of an omniarchy with h — 0 and unth (IF. 0jR . 9jA) 
equal to (0.9 - ^ ,  — 9j^y) amounts to
£ ( n |O ( i \ j ) ; ( O ,0 ^ , -0 ,k + 1» =
Ah k + 2 
4 H I
(45)
The latter set of threshold values gives rise to the highest expected profit.
A direct corollary of this proposition is that any increase in the ratio k 
leads to a decrease in expected profits:
Corollary 5
dk  [
That is, even in an omniarchy, implying a second test of each and every 
project, increasing the ratio k leads to a decrease in expected profits.
I now limit attention to the case where k = 1. As agents can now 
be heterogeneous, an important question that should be addressed is who 
should be the first to look at a project. Mr. / or Ms.j  ? As there are 
multiple vectors of consistent cut-off values possible for every segment 
of the line k = 1, except for h = —^9, a choice has to be made from 
among these vectors. For every pair of parameters (9. h) and for either 
ordering of the agents I take the vector of threshold values that maximizes 
the expected profit. Then, for every pair (O.h). I compare the expected 




























































































Proposition 11 In an omniarchy. the ordering of heterogeneous agents 
matters. For k =  1, the agent with, the smallest variance should he the 
first to analyze a project in order to maximize expected pay-offs.
This proposition shows that, contrary to both a hierarchy and a polyar­
chy, but like a single agent organization, the ordering of heterogeneous 
agents matters in an omniarchy. The intuition is that, although the se­
cond agent's cut-off rule reflects the overall organizational structure and 
in particular the decision taken by the first agent, in a certain sense, it is 
the second agent who decides. The first agent merely signals information 
it has. When the second agent has to decide on the project, it knows its 
own valuation, but is uncertain about the other agent’s. Hence, just as in 
a single agent case, the second agent prefers a more informative signal to 
a less informative one. Therefore, the first agent should be the one with 
the smallest variance.
The effect of increasing differences between agents on organizational 
performance is positive for any vector (9,h), as the following corollary 
shows.
Corollary 6 For any vector of parameters (9, h), and for k — 1. an incre­
ase in the difference between agents has a positive effect on the performance 
of a hierarchy.
6 .1  A c c e p t a n c e  f o r  lo w  v a l u a t i o n s
As I noted above, that part of Mr. i ’s best response which requires the ac­
ceptance of relatively low valued projects cannot lead to consistent thres­
hold values since until now the best reply functions of Ms. j  are based 
on the assumption that Mr. i rejects for low values. That is, equations 
(41) cannot lead to consistent threshold values since equations (37) and 
(38) are based on the assumption that Mr. i accepts if and only if 9‘ > 9'. 
What, however, would happen if the cut-off values Ms. j  applies are based 
on the assumption that projects with a sufficiently low value have been 
accepted by Mr. i ? That is, what if Mr. i were known to accept if and 




























































































the preceeding section, and applied by Ms. j  in case of projects accepted 
by Mr. i would now be identical to the cut off rule applied by Ms. j  in case 
of projects rejected by Mr./when acceptance requires 9‘ < 0‘. Ms. j  still 
accepts only those projects with a sufficiently high value 9K and lemma 6, 
stating W as a function of (W ,9jA). therefore still applies. Since Ms. js 
reaction function is now based on the assumption that Mr. i acceptes if 
and only if 9‘ < 9‘ part (39) no longer leads to consistent threshold values; 
indeed, only parts (40) and (41) may give rise to consistent values.
That only part (40) and (41) can lead to consistent cut-off values 
can be seen as follows as well. Suppose —9 < a , < a l < 9, where a‘ and a ' 
are two signals obtained by Mr. i . What are the necessary conditions on 
63 and 9J for it to be possible that the project with a‘ will be accepted 
by i, but the project with a‘ will be rejected? Suppose the omniarchy is 
such that all projects rejected by Mr. i are rejected by Ms. j  as well, but 
that a project accepted by i may or may not be accepted by j. That is. 
WR > 9 +  h > WA > —9 — h, or the omniarchy is equivalent to a hierarchy. 
A project Mr. i rejects is rejected for sure by the organization, while a 
project he accepts may get accepted by the organization. Therfore, since 
Mr. i is rational, he does not want- to reject an apparently more profitable 
project with valuation a' and at the same time accept a seemingly less 
profitable project characterized by a' . The same line of reasoning applies 
to the polyarchy, and indeed to any omniarchy in which WR > 9jA . That 
is, part (39) , which is based on WR > 91' cannot be consistent with Mr. i 
accepting relatively low valued projects.
Consequently, if Mr. i accepts only those projects 9' with 9‘ < 9‘ the 




-OG , O C )
i9‘ > 9 
9‘ € (-9,9)  
f  < -9
I  > 9 
W G (-9.9)  






























































































Mr. i accepts if and only if 9‘ < 9‘. where 9‘ = 9‘{9*l>. 6̂ '*) satisfies
The following proposition can now be seen to hold.
Proposition 12 Suppose (9‘, WR, 0*A) = (0* , ) is a consistent
vector of threshold values solving equations (37), (38), (39), and (40) for 
a particular vector (9, h, k) under the assumption that i accepts if and only 
if 9' > O'. Then the vector (O' ,(?R , t fA) = (9‘ , 9]A , 9jR ) is a consistent 
vector of threshold values solving equations (47), (43), (40), and (50) 
under the assumption that i accepts if and. only if 9‘ < 9‘. The converse 
of this proposition holds as well.
An example may help to illustrate. Suppose that the (8‘ ,WR .W ') = 
(5,12,7) is a vector of consistent threshold values for some vector of pa­
rameters (9,h,k), and assume that a project, characterized by (9‘.9J) — 
(9,8) is analyzed by the organization. Let me compare the organizational 
decision this project encounters when (i) Mr. i accepts a project if and 
only if 9‘ > 0‘, and the threshold values equal [9‘, 9j ') = (5.12.7) 
with the situation (ii) in which Mr. i accepts if and only if 9‘ < . and
(49)
or all projects are accepted ( be., 9‘ > 9) for
W ,W > 9  + h or 
9jR,0iA < - 9 -  h or 






























































































the cut off values equal (O' ,WH ,W'K) -  (5. 7.12). In (i). 9 = O' > O' — Ô. 
and so the project will he accepted by Mr. /Then Ms. j  decides to accept 
the project as 8 = > 0J = 7, so the project will be accepted by the
organization as a whole. In (ii) on the other hand. Mr. / will reject the 
project since 9 = 0‘ > 0‘ = 5. Now it arrives as a rejected project on 
Ms. js  desk, which she now compares with her threshold value 0: — 7.
Hence, she accepts the project. The organization as a whole reacts in tin' 
same way in both cases.
This implies a very strong form of multiplicity of consistent threshold 
values. A direct corollary of this result is that proposition 9, which gives 
the consistent threshold values under the assumption that Mr. i accepts if 
and only if O' > O'. is applicable as well when Mr. Z accepts if and only if 
O' < 0‘ once the values for 0jH and 0J ' have been interchanged. This, in 
turn, has an important implication.
Corollary 7 The expected profit of an omniarchy in case of a vector of 
consistent threshold values (0‘,O'R,8jA) = (O' , 0J>< ,0^A ). and where i 
accepts if and only if O' > O' is equal to the expected profit of an omniarchy 
in case of (O',0^R,0J'A) = (O' , 6jA , 0^  ), and where i accepts if and only 
if 0i < O'.
This equivalence in terms of expected profits makes the choice of a parti­
cular vector of consistent threshold values and of a particular acceptance 
rule used by Mr. i on the basis of the ensuing profits impossible.
7 A  C om p arison
In the preceeding sections I studied in detail the behaviour of rational 
agents within given organizational structures. For a given vector of para­
meters characterizing the agents and the projects the organization faces 
I determined each agent's best response, consistent threshold values, the 
ensuing organization pay off, and the optimal ordering of heterogeneous 




























































































though, that different organizations respond in diverse ways to changes in 
the environment. In this section I compare the performance of different 
organizational forms, using two standards, the first being the expected 
profits made on accepted projects. The second standard takes as well 
the expected value of good but rejected projects into account. As the 
presence of good, but neglected projects represents a loss from a welfare 
perspective, this measure reflects in a more accurate way an organization's 
contribution to social welfare. These results are summarized in four pro­
positions. Section 7.1 gives the results when organizations are compared 
on the basis of expected profits, while section 7.2 states two results when 
the comparison taking the neglected but good projects into account.
The analysis sofar has shown that the ordering of heterogenous 
agents is inconsequential as far as organizational performance is concerned 
in case of a hierarchy and a polyarchy. An omniarchy, however, requires 
ordinal information concerning the agents characteristics. The latter then 
is more demanding, informationally speaking, than the former two. In­
deed, the omniarchy’s superior performance may vanish partly or wholy 
if no such ordinal information is available. This observation is the subject 
of section 7.3.
7 .1  A  c o m p a r i s o n  b a s e d  o n  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t s
Proposition 13 When agents are identical (h = 0), the expected pay off 
induces the following ordering of organizational forms:
' E{U\0) > E{Tl\P) > E{U\H) > £(II|S) : k < 1
- E{U\0) > E(U\H) = E(U\P) > E(n|S) : Jfc = 1 (31)
£(II|0 ) > E(U\H) > £ (n |P )  > £(II|S) : k > 1
These results are in line with what one would intuitively expect. The 
omniarchy performs the best for every value of k sis it requires a double 
check on every project. Similarily, the single agent organization performs 
the worst as it implies just a single check of any project’s quality. That a 
hierarchy performs better than a polyarchy reflects the hierarchy's second 
check of a project accepted by the first agent. This is beneficial in the 




























































































Proposition 14 If the possible losses and yarns on an accepted, project 
are identical, i.e.. if k — 1. if agents are optimally allocated within organi­
zations, and if the value of 0 remains fixed the ordering of organizations 
is as follows:
|  £ ( n |0 ) > r ( n | / / )  = £ (n |P ) = £(ii|S ) : h e  (-0 .-^0]
l £ (II |0 ) > £ (II|tf) = £(II|P) > £(II|S) : h e  (-±0,0) (32)
( E(U\0) > E(U\H) = E(U\P) = £(II|S) : h > 0
The main interest of this proposition is that it shows that the polyarchy 
and the hierarchy perform equally well if the possible losses on accepted 
projects are as high as their possible gains.
7 .2  A  c o m p a r i s o n  t a k i n g  r e j e c t e d ,  b u t  g o o d  p r o j e c t s  
i n t o  a c c o u n t
Until now I have limited attention to the performance of organizational 
forms from the perspective of the organization itself. Agents maximized 
expected pay-offs of accepted projects, and different architectures were 
compared using expected pay-offs of such projects as a criterion for orde­
ring them. That is, the value of rejected, but profitable projects played 
no role in the analysis sofar. This captures well the interests of a firm, at 
least when it operates in isolation. From society's point of view, however, 
rejected profitable projects represent a welfare loss. Indeed, from this per­
spective the best organizational form is the one that accepts all profitable 
projects but rejects all bad projects. And even from the vantage point of 
the firm rejected profitable projects merely reflect the structurally deter­
mined incompleteness of information due to the limited number of agents 
appraising projects.
Figure 8 represent the single agent, the hierarchy, the polyarchy, 
and the omniarchy, respectively. In each figure, the white area represents 
the inefficient projects that have been rejected, the light grey area the 
profitable projects that have been accepted, the grey area the inefficient 




























































































0j ,0‘ = 0
0' = o f
0J = 0J
0J = oi
+ 0j = 0
Polyarchy O' + 0̂  = 0 Omniarchy
OJ = 0jA
O' + 0j = 0




























































































projects that have been rejected. The figures assume that agents are 
identical, or h — 0.
Graphically, then, the index I use in this section takes the size of the 
dark gray into account as well. The larger it is. the more good projects 
have been rejected. Dp is calculatad as the difference between, on the one 
hand, the expected value of accepted projects, and. on the other hand, the 
expected value of the sum of accepted but bad projects and rejected but 
good projects for a given organizational form F 6 {.S’. II. P. O }. The two 
propositions that follow analyze the behaviour of D for two special cases: 
the heterogeneous agents case (h — 0), and the case where the absolute 
value of possible profits and losses are identical (k = 1).
Proposition 15 If agents are identical, h — 0. the following ordering of 
organizational forms is induced by the index D3:
Do > Dp > Da > Ds ■ k £ (0,1.8)
' Do > Dp = Dh < Ds ■ k — 1.8 (53)
Dq > D/i > Dp > Ds ■ A’ > 1.8
This proposition shows that the finer approximation as implied by an 
omniarchy leads to an improvement relative to the other organizational 
forms when measured by the index D. The single agent organization 
performs the worst throughout the whole range of k. The polyarchy is 
still performing better than the hierarchy for low values, and has even 
extended the set of values for which this is the case. For high values of k. 
the hierarchy is still performing better than the polyarchy.
Proposition 16 If the possible losses and gains on a project are identical. 
i.e., if k — 1, if agents are optimally allocated within organizations using 
the expected profits on accepted projects as the standard, and if the value 
of 0 remains fixed, the following holds:





























































































Do > Dp — Ds — D a h e (
Dq > Dp > Dg > Dp h G (
Do > D p > D a > Ds h 6 f
Do > Dp > Dg > Dp h G (
. Do > Dp — Ds - Dp h >0
-0 .-I0
, ï i M )
The omniarchy is still performing the best. Interestingly, this proposition 
shows that in the presence of heterogeneous agents the polyarchy is always 
performing better than the hierarchy. Indeed, the hierarchy may perform 
even worse than the single agent.
7 .3  I n f o r m a t i o n a l  P r o b l e m s
Suppose that the persons that analyze projects have not decided themsel­
ves on the organizational form, and suppose that they have not decided 
either on the order in which they decide. Rather, this has been decided 
by somebody else. An example could be some departmental organization 
deciding on the implementation of some new product. The organizatio­
nal structure may have been laid down a long time ago by head quarters, 
while the positions are filled by a board of people that does not analyze 
the products itself. In such a situation the persons that actually analyze 
the projects are likely to have more detailed information about their own 
characteristics and the characteristics of the projects they are to analyze. 
In particular, head quarters and the board may not know which agent has 
the larger interval for its valuations. Hence, the board may want to de­
cide to set up a decisional structure which performance is independent of 
the exact ordering of the agents, or which is robust to wrongly positioned 
agents.
The following proposition shows the omniarchy is not robust to such 
misplacements. It may therefore be preferable to set up an organizational 
structure like the hierarchy or the polyarchy that does not require a par­
ticular ordering for maximum performance. In particular, the proposition 
says that if the agents have been allocated well half of the time, and if 
the possible loss on a project is equal to the possible gain, an omniarchy 




























































































Proposition 17 If the agents in an ornmarchy have been positioned well 
half of the time, and if k = 1. then the expected profits of an ornmarchy 
are lower than the expected pay-offs of a hierarchy or a polyarchy for every 
value of h.
8 R ela ted  L iterature
Part of the existing literature on the internal structure of the firm and its 
effect on firm behaviour follows the Sah and Stiglitz framework of fallible 
agents. Koh ((1992), (1993a), (1993b), (1994a), and (1994b)) extends re­
sults obtained by Sah and Stiglitz by introducing the problem of moral 
hazard, by comparing the speed with which decisions are taken within hier­
archies and polyarchies, by discussing the effect of variable evaluation costs 
on the relative performance of hierachies and polyarchies, by introducing 
a continuous signal model in a commitee framework, and by populating 
hierarchies and polyarchies with more than two agents, respectively. Io- 
annides (1987), relying on results obtained by Shannon and Moore, notes 
that the screening quality of an organization can be arbitrarily improved 
by replacing an agent by a replica of the original organizational structure 
as a whole. Perfect decisions can be obtained by judiciously arranging an 
infinite amount of error-prone decision-makers. He discusses as well the 
introduction of incentives. Both Bull and Ordover (1987) and Hendrikse 
(1992) discuss the relationship between the choice of the internal structure 
and the market environment. Sobel (1992), finally, looks at the best way 
an erratic human should count to thousand.
Other contributions assume full rationality on behalf of the agents 
populating organizations. In the context, Marschak and Radner (1972) 
study the role and value of decentralized information processing and com­
munication within organizations whose agents form a team i.e.. whose 
preferences coincide. Carter (1995) is a recent contribution to this line of 
research.
Both Radner (1993). and Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) model the 




























































































The organizational goal is to process a repeatedly arriving hatch of infor­
mation. Radner measures the performance of a network by the processing 
time and number of units required, while Bolton and Dewatripont focus 
on the costs of processing and communicating information.
Vassilakis (forthcoming) relates the time needed to develop a new 
product to the organization’s architecture. Some organizational forms give 
rise to procrastination, cycling, and back-tracking, impeding a swift intro­
duction of a new product, while others are conducive to solving problems 
concomitant to the development of new products quickly.
The present paper is related as well to the literature on social lear­
ning. Social learning refers to situations in which a number of selfish 
agents decide sequentially on the basis of both private information and 
information revealed by previously taken decisions. As the pay-off agents 
obtain are left unaffected by succeeding agents' decisions, agents do not 
take the informational impact of their actions into account when deciding. 
Typically, one decision is “good”, while the other is “bad”, but the lat­
ter becomes the choice of rational agents, given the information revealed 
by previous decisions. Since an agent decides whatever the preceeding 
agents’ decisions, this situation is related to the omniarchy studied in 
this paper. The main questions asked in these papers are of a statisti­
cal nature: what is the probability that the population of agents makes 
the wrong decision, what is the probability that this population, after a 
series of wrong decisions, breaks out of this situation, etc.? (see for exam­
ple Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). and Vives (1996)). Gul 
and Lundholm (1995) address the question what ordering arises if hete­
rogeneous agents control the moment of decision. This issue is related to 
the optimal ordering of heterogeneous agents within given organizational 
structures studied here. Gale (1996) argues that the literature on social 
learning pays undue attention to the statistical aspects involved, at the 
cost of ignoring the value created by sequential decision structures. In 






























































































In this paper, I discuss the effect organizational structure can have on 
organizational performance in a project selection framework by analysing 
four different organizational architectures; a single agent organization, a 
hierarchy, a polyarchy, and an omniarchy. The agents' choices reflect the 
overall organizational structure, and, in particular, the informational con­
tent of other agents’ actions. Agents maximize the expected profits made 
on accepted projects. An omniarchy, characterized by a double check on 
every project, performs uniformly the best, while a single agent organiza­
tion is always performing the worst. The ordering of the polyarchy and 
the hierarchy, two organizational forms allowing for a conditional second 
instance of screening on the basis of independent information depends on 
both the characteristics of the agents and on the type of environment. 
If agents are different, the polyarchy and the hierarchy are performing 
equally well, whereas in the case of agent are identical the hierarchy per­
forms better than the polyarchy in tough environments. The opposite 
holds for relatively friendly environments.
I compare as well the performance of these organizations relative to 
the ideal organization that accepts all good projects and rejects all bad 
ones. Once again, the omniarchy performs best, and the single agent orga­
nization the worst. The ordering of the polyarchy and the hierarchy in case 
of identical agents, however, is reversed, with now the polyarchy better 
approximating the ideal organization for tough project environments.
This should, however, not be taken as evidence that the omniarchy 
is the best structure when the goal is to select projects, as I showed it to 
have certain drawbacks relative to the other organizational forms. Firstly. 
I show that the optimal allocation of agents within a given organizational 
structure requires more detailed information about the agents' characteri­
stics in an omniarchy than in a hierarchy or in a polyarchy. Secondly, the 
omniarchy suffers from the multiplicity of consistent individual decision 
rules, which may even give rise to the same expected profit. This com­
plicates the choice of a specific set of individual decision rules. Thirdly, 




























































































in evaluating projects. Although this causes no problem in the sotting 
studied here, a thorough, but slow project selection procedure may well 
have negative effects on firm performance when operating in a competi­
tive environment. The trade-offs these disadvantages imply constitute an 




























































































A  P roofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Compare the value of 0‘ as determined by (3) with 
the boundaries of the interval of 0‘ £ (—0.0). taking into account the 
restriction that h > —0.
Proof of Lemma 2 Similar to the proof of lemma 1.
P roof of Proposition 1 In general, the profit expression equals
A'i -  (Prob(A | Good) — kProb(A \ Bad))
since the probability that a project is good equals a half. If j  is the only 
agent, lemma 2 applies. For h < —02/(k A 1) and k > 1. no project 
is accepted, and hence E(U\S(j)) — 0. while for h > —02k/(k + 1) and 
k < 1, all projects are accepted. Therefore £(II|S(j)) = A'i(l — k)/2. 
Finally, if 0J £ (—0 A h.O A h). the profit expression depends on the the 
sign of h. For h > 0, figure 2 shows that the expected profits equal
the difference between A"i. 1
V
( 0 - 0 ‘)(0+h + 0)~  ~ (0~0 ')2 
~  20(0 Ah) . the i
hand and A ■> -2
( ( 0 -  f ) ( - f  + 0 + h) -  \(0  -  0l)2\
V
, (20 + h(k + \ ) f
equals x '80(0 + h)(k + i y
20(0 Ah)
For h £ ( —0
on the other. This
/
k A 1
. 0 ] and k < 1, or for
h e -0 2k
i^A l '
, 0 and k > 1, the expression amounts to
* 4




which boils down to the expression AV „
1 x 2(0 A h)(k A l)
for £(II|S(i)) can be obtained in the same fashion.
2 0(0 Ah)  
0 A h(k A 1 )
/
. The expressions





























































































Proof of Lemma 3 First the case where h > 0. Figure 3 suggests to look 
at the order in which 9>(0') and O’(O') cut.the line O' — —9. Hence. f)‘ < —9 
if ancl only if 9'(—9) — 0‘ (—9) > 0. This is equivalent to 0‘ < —9 if and
only if h > 9-^~. The same kind of analysis applies to the case where
h < 0. Here, O' < — 9 — h if and only if 0J (—9 — h) — 0‘(—9 — li) < 0. 
This is equivalent to 0J < —9 — h if and only if h < — 9
Proof of Proposition 3 From lemma 3 it is clear that O' < —9 — h for 
h £ (-9, < - 9 3̂ ] .  Hence, O'(O' = -9  -  h) =  (9 + h ) F o r  - 9 ^  < 
h < 9-f 9' and 9' solve the pair of equations O' — 9'(O') and O' = O'(9‘). 
The solution is O' = — ̂ 2t+I — ^Jk+T’^  = ^ 2X+T' Finally, for
h > 0$ j ^  < -0  and so 0J' equals ^(5* = -  A) = (6» + A)|=f.
Proof of Proposition 4 O' < —9 — h for h £ (—0, — Hence,  
profits equal the level of profits made in a single agent organization by 
i for h < 0. For h > 9-^~, or 9‘ < 9, profits equal the profts made in 
single agent organization consisting of agent j  only for h > 0. Finally, for 
h £ (—9-^^,9^~ j ), use figure 4 to write
X i (9 -  0£)(0 + h -  9') -  4±i( -9 '  -  9'Ÿ 
~2 29(9 + h)
which equals
(l + k)(29 + hfi 
189(9 + h)(2k + l)
Proof of Proposition 5 Consider lemma 1.
Lemma 7 Suppose 9 >  0 and h > —9, and define 9' and h' as 9' := 9 + h 
and h' —h, respectively. Then, 9' > 0 and h! > — 9'. Moreover.
h ^  07— T < k +  1 h'




























































































Proof Suppose h < 0j^\- Then 0 = 0 + h < Moreover, h' =
—/i > —0 ^ .  Therefore, h' > — = —̂ iif+T- The same kind °f
reasoning shows that h > 0~~ <=> //' < —
This lemma establishes that if both 0‘ G (—(9.0) and G (— 6* — li.O + //). 
then both f  G (-0 '.0 ') =  ( -0  -  ft, 0 + *) and 0J' G (-0 ' -  /(', 6»' + /»') = 
(—0,0). This implies that before and after the switch of positions of 
Mr. i and Ms. j within the hierarchy, the expected profit is determined 
by the middle entry of equation (23). which is independent of 0 and h. 
Therefore, pay offs are left unaffected by the swapping of positions. Now 
suppose that h > 9 - ^ .  Hence, h' < —0- ĵ~̂ - The pay-off comparison 
therefore equals the difference between the bottom entry of equation (23) 
with (0, h) equal to (0, h) and the top entry equation (23) with (0. h) equal 
to (0',h') = (0 + h, —h). It is a matter of a simple calculus to show that 
these expressions are identical.
P roof of Lemma 4 I discuss the cases (I) W > 0 + h, (II) 0J G (— 0 — h. 
0 + h), and (III) 0J < — 0 — h in turn.
(I) First the case where 0J > 0 + h. or Pr(0J > 0J) = 0. Mr. i ‘s decision 
rule becomes Accept if and only if 0‘ satisfies A', Pr(0J > —0*)—A'2 Pr(0J < 
—0') > 0. This is equivalent to Accept if and only if 0' > 0‘ := |^ j(0  + h).
(II) Now assume 0J G (—0 — h,0 + h). I split this case up in three subca­
ses: (1) 0{ >0 + h. (2) 0{ < -0  -  h, and (3) 0‘ G ( -0  -  h,0 + h).
(11.1) If 0*' > 0 + h, Pr(0i > 0*') = 1 = Pr(0> > —0‘\0i > 0iR). Mr.i ’s 
decision rule becomes Accept if and only if 0‘ satisfies A' 1 > Pr( 0J >9J)X\. 
Hence, for 0' > 0 + h the project is accepted.
(11.2) If 0‘ < —0 — h, the decision rule amounts to Accept if and only if 
0‘ satisfies —A'2 > — Pr(£h > 0J )A’2. Hence, for 0‘ < —0 — h the project 
is rejected.
(11.3) If 0‘ G (—0 — It. 0 + h). two cases obtain: (a) —0‘ < 0J and (b) 
—0l > 0J. In case of (a), Pr(0J > — 0‘|0J > O''11) — 1. and the decision rule 
boils down to Accept if and only if
( 9  +  h + 0’\ / -01' + 0 +  h\ { o  +  h - V }




























































































or, 9‘ > — O'* + + />)• If >s straightforward to show that +
1 ^ ( 0 + h) £ {-tf 'O  + h). Hence, for 9‘ £ + & &  + h)\
a project will he rejected, while for 9‘ £ (—̂  + j^n(9 + h). 9 + h) a
project will be accepted.
In case of (b), Pr((9J > — 9‘\9J > 9jR) £ (0.1), and the decision rule 
boils down to Accept if and only if —k(0 + h) > kf)J. which is false since 
9 + h > —6J by assumption. Hence for —9‘ > W a project is rejected. 
In summary, if 91 £ (9 + h, —9 — h). then the decision rule amounts to
Accept if and only if 9' > 9‘ := — Jjpy + pyp-fd + h).
(Ill) Finally the case where 9J < —9 — h in turn. The decision rule be­
comes A',Pr(<9J > 9{) -  X 2Pi(9j < 9‘) > A ,Pr(^  > 9‘) -  A'2P r < 9‘) 
which never holds, and every project is therefore rejected: 9 > 9.
Proof of Lemma 5 Thi proof is similar to the proof of lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 6 The proof is similar to the proof of proposi­
tion 3.
Proof of Proposition 7 I use figure 6 to write
^(n iPC U ))*! /i2À.-(Â,- + l)-|-80(6' + /t) 89(9 + h)(k + 2)
For h £ (—9, —9 j^ ) ,  93 > 9 + h, and the profit expression equals the one 
of the single agent i for negative values of h, while for h > 9 - ^ .  9‘ > 9. 
and so the profits ecjual the profits obtained by a single agent j, for h > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8 Consider lemma 8:




>>' > - o 'k b




























































































The proof of proposition 8 is now similar to the proof of proposition 5. 
The main difference is the fact that in the case of a polyarchy, profits for 
h £ do depend on 9 and h.
Proof of Lemma 6 For 9jl< > 9 + h an onmiarchy turns into a hierarchy, 
which has been discussed in section 4. For 9J' < —9 — h it becomes a 
polyarchy, and the proof of W (9J><,WA) is equivalent to the proof of ü‘(W) 
in case of a polyarchy. Attention will therefore be limited to those cases 
where 9̂  ' > —9 — h and QjR < 9 + h.
(I) Suppose 9jR < —9 — h. and assume either (1) 9J ' > 9 + h or (2) 
0jA € ( - e - h , 9  + h).
(1.1) For 0*A > 9 + h. Mr. i ’s decision problem becomes Accept if and
only if 9' satisfies 0 > A|Pr(fP > 9') — A'2Pr(9> < 9‘). This is equivalent 
to Accept if and only if 9' < 9‘ + h).
(1.2) 9jA £ (—9 — h.9 + h). This case I split up in (a) 9' > 9 + h. (b) 
9‘ < —9 — h. and (c) 9‘ £ (—9 — h.9 + h).
(1.2.a) 9' > 9 + h. and therefore Pr(fP > 9‘) = Pr(0J > — 9,\9j > 9J l ) = 1. 
Therefore, the decision rule amounts to Accept if and only if
(9  + h - 9 iA\  
\  2(9 + h) ) A', > A,
which is false. So, if 9' > 9 + h a project will be rejected.
(I.2.b) Analogously, if 9' < —9 — h. a project will be accepted.
(I.2.c) For 9l £ (—9 — h. 9 + h). two subcases should be distinguished: (i) 
-9 ' > 9jA and (ii) - 9 ‘ < 0jA.
(I.2.c.i) —9‘ > 9jA. The decision rule becomes Accept if and only if 
9 > —9 — h. Since this is false by assumption, a project with —9‘ > 9
will be rejected.
—j A(I.2.c.ii) For —9‘ < v  , a project will only be accepted if
[0 + h - 9 iA\  x.  ̂ ^  (9  + h + 9 ‘\  , f - 9 ‘ + 9 + h \




























































































which amounts to Accept if and only if 9‘ < — ■ĵ r\9jA + yry(^ + h). It is 
easy to show that — ^  ($ + /*) € (—9jA .9 + /().
In summary, for 0*R < —9 — h and W ' € (—9 — h,9 + h) a project is 
accepted if and only if 9‘ < O' ^ -9*A + + h).
(II) Suppose 9J 4 > 9 + h and 9jR £ (—9 — h,9 + h). The cases where 9‘ > 
9 + h or 9‘ < —9 — h can be handled in the same way as is done in (1.2.a) 
and (I.2.b), respectively; in the first case, a project will lie rejected, while 
in the second case it will be accepted. Let me therefore limit attention to 
9' £ (—9 — h, 9 + h). This is similar to case (I.2.c); hence, for WA > 9 + h 
and 9̂ R £ (—9 — h,9 + h), a project will be accepted if and only if 9‘ < 
tf : = - ^ k(9 + h + k9jR).
(III) The case that remains to be studied is 9iR.W A £ (—9 — h,9 + h). I 
split this case up in three subcases: (1) 9l > 9 + h, (2) 9‘ < —9 — li. and 
(3) 9i £ ( - 9 - h , 9  + h).
(111.1) For 9‘ > 9 + h Pr(9j > -9'\9> > O’**) = Pr(9> > - 9 ‘\9j > 0jA) = 1. 
and the decision rule becomes Accept if and only if 9‘ satisfies
9 + h - 9 jA\  ( 9 + h - 9 jR\
2(9 + h) J  ‘ > V 2(9+ h) )  *' 1
which is equivalent to WA < WR. Hence, if 9jA < WR. a project with 9‘ > 
9 + h will be accepted, while if 4 > 9 R̂, a project satisfying 9‘ > 9 + li 
will be rejected.
(111.2) Reasoning in the same for 91 < —9 — h, I obtain that a project will 
be rejected if 9^A < 9̂ R, while it will be accepted if 9jA > 9}R.
(111.3) I split this up in four subcases: (a) —9‘ < m in ^ ’4,9*R), (b) 9J 4 < 
—9* < 9jR, (c) 9jR < - 9 l < 9jA, and (d) WR ,WA < - 9 ‘.
(III.3.a) If —9' < min(VA,WR), then Pr(6>> > 9‘\0i > 0jR) = Pr(9J >- 
9‘\9i > 9iA) — 1, which is equivalent to case (III.l). Therefore, if W 4 < 
9jR, a project with 9' > 9 + h will be accepted, while if &*A > 9jR. a 
project satisfying 9‘ > 9 + h will be rejected.
(III.3.b) WA < -9 ' < 9jR, and therefore 9jA < 0jR. Hence. Pr(0> > 




























































































Accept if and only if 0' satisfies
h  + h - w A\  { /  ff + h + 0‘ \  (  - e ‘ - w A \ \  ( o + h - w H\
V 2 ( O  +  l i )  J  \ [ o  +  h - d J A )  \0  +  h - W 'j J  > \ 2(6»+ /i) J
which is equivalent to Accept if and only if O' > — (0^R + kO* I t
is easy to show that — yy-y (ojR + kOJ ') £ (— WH 0*A). Therefore, for 
0‘ £ (—0jR, —yyy (ff*R + ')] a project will he rejected, while a project
will be accepted if and only if 0‘ £ (— x+T + kO*A') . —P A).
(III.3.c) WH < —0‘ < &’A, and therefore at least 0J>< < WA. The decision 
rule becomes Accept if and only if 0‘ satisfies
( o  +  h - o jA\ ( e  +  h -  oJR\ f  (  6 +  h +  ei \ , (  - o ‘ -  djR \\
[  2(e + h) J > {  2(0 + h) ) { { 0 + h - o jR)  k [ 0 + h _ p « J )
which amounts to Accept if and only if
O' < (oJA + k^ R) e ( -o jA, - o jR)
(III.3.d) And finally the case where WR, 01 A < —O'. This amounts to 0jA > 
0jR. Hence, a project will be accepted if 6j A > 0*R, while it will be rejected 
if 0*A < 0*R. In summary, for 0*R,0*A £ (—0 — h.O + h). and 0jR > 0jA a 
project will be accepted if and only if O' > — yyy (0*R + kO’^ ;  if, however,
t fR < #J ' a project will be accepted if and only if O' < — yyy
and in case 0J * — 0jA no project will be accepted at all. hence O' > 0.
Proof of Proposition 9 (I) As noted in the main body of the text, for 
0J > 0 + h an omniarchy turns into a hierarchy. The idea is then to check 
whether &*R > 0 + h is a best reply to the consistent threshold value for 
Mr. i as given in proposition 3. This proposition suggests to split up the 
proof in four parts: (1) —0 < h <  — #yfyy- (2) h £ (-^y ly y ^^ y ). (3) 
h > Ofa,  and (4) V(O.h.k).
(1.1) For -0  < h < -9r±£y, V = (0 + h ) ^  £ (-0.0). Therefore 




























































































to 0 + h if and only if h < — Ojr^. Combining this with 
I obtain the condition k < 1 and h G (
' 3jfc+ f  )  *
* •-» & )•  or A > 1 and
(1.2) For* € ( - * = & , f Æ ) '# '
ejR(9i)
-f)—1---- h ITt (=
2A-+A-+1TP 1 i a  t  __ a
~u k+1 ‘r  u k+1 — p(2i+l)(fc+l) + h -
—— <= 1 —0.0). and therefore 
---- This is(2*+l)(*+l>
than or equal to 0 + h if and only if h < — 0-^-j, which, given the initial 
assumption, amounts to h £ Ü 2 k .U-+1 ■ - O -
(1.3) For h > 0‘ < —0. and therefore 03R(0‘) G (—oc.oc). and
therefore 03 > 0 + h is a best response.
(1.4) V(0, /f, A-), 9‘ > 0 is a consistent cut off value. 0J'\o') - 0 ^ j-, which 
is bigger than or equal to 0 + h if and only if h < —9-̂ y.
(II) Similarily, the case where 03’* < —0 — //. amounts to a polyarchy. 
The proof proceeds in the same way as under (I). by checking whether 
9jA < —0 — h is a best response to the threshold value O'- as determined 
in proposition 6. Three subcases will be discussed in turn: (1) —9 < h  <
(2) h € M sM itt)’ aQd (3) h >  %tt-
(II.1) —9 < h <  —0-j—j  and therefore = (0 + /i)§+}- Therefore, h < 
—̂isf+T A° ensure that O3 ' ^ )  < —oo.
(II.2) If /) G ( - 0 ^ . 0  2 -0,0). and therefore 
which is smaller
ife+3’'/ <fc+i then 0 — 01+2 -T /i t+2 G (
(it  \  _  _ TP _ _  z j  1 _ _  _ / j  f c 2 + f c + 2  _ _  z ,  A r + A :
f7 7 17 * + l  ^Jfc+l “  ,7 (ife+2)(Jfc+l) (fe+2)(Ar+l) ’
than or equal to —0 — /i  if and only if It < — 0 This combined with 
the initial assumption leads to h G (• -*ST3.
*•+ r
(II.3) /( > and therefore 0‘ > 0. Hence. 0J '(O') G (—00, 00) , which 
allows for 0jA < —0 — h.
(Ill) For 0jR = O3A G ( —0 — h.O + h) Mr. i s best response equals 0‘ > 0. 
to which Ms. j ’s best response is 0J 1 = 0 |v j, and O3 A G (—oc.oo). Hence, 
if 03R = WA — G [—0 — h.O + /(), a consistent set of threshold levels 
exists. 0 j ^  G {—0 — li.0 + h) if and only if k < 1 and h > — 0-^~. or 




























































































(IV) Filially, suppose 0jR. 0jA E (— 0 — h. 0 + h ) and 0J ' < 0jR. Therefore 
0‘ = — (O*H + k0jA ĵ ■ I split this case up in three subcases: (1) 0' E
(-0.0). (2) 0‘ > 0. and (3) f  < -0.
(IV.l) For ~0l E (-0.0). t  = 0. 0jR = 0 - ^ .  and 0jA = - 0 ^  is the 
unique solution if the condition 0jR. € (—0 — h.0 + h) is satisfied.
These constraints are satisfied if and only if k < 1 and h > —0 ^ .  or 
k > 1 and h > — 0j^y.
(IV.2) 0‘ > 0. and therefore 0jR(0‘) = 0 ^ \  which should be within the 
interval (—0 — h.0 + h). Hence, k < 1 and h > —0 j ^ -  or k > 1 and h > 
- 0 ^ .  Moreover, 0jA < 0jR and 0jA E ( ~0~h . 0  + h). 5,'(3/J\ * M) > 0 
and (fR - is equivalent to W ' < — 0 j ^  which is strictly smaller than 
—0 < 0 + h. Hence, for t0 within ( -0  -  h,0 + h). — 0 -  h <
— should hold, which is the case if and only h > 0 - ^ .  Consequently, 
there are consistent threshold values if and only if h >
(IV.3) 0‘ < — 0 and therefore WA(0‘) = which should be within the 
interval (—0 — h.0 + h). Hence, k < 1 and h > —0 - ^ .  or k > 1 and h > 
-0 j£ i .  Moreover, 0jA < WR and WR E (-0  -  h.0 + h). 0i(0jR.0jA) < -0  
and 0̂ A = 0j^\ is equivalent to 02R > 0 j ^  which is strictly smaller than 
0 > -0  -  h. Hence, for -6>f±f to be within ( -0  - h . 0  + h).0 + h>  0 
should hold, which is the case if and only h > 0 - ^ .  Consequently, there 
are consistent threshold values if and only if h >
Proof of Proposition 10 For h = 0, there are two vectors of consi­
stent threshold values: (W.0jR.0jA) = ( 0 , 0 and (0i.0jR.0jA) = 
(0, $FeT, — t l̂e first case' expected profits equal
X i 202 -  \(0jR + 0 f  -  \(WR + 0 f
~2 W2
which equals X\/(2(k  +  1)). In the second case, the expected pay-off 
amounts to





























































































which is equal to X\(k  + 2)/(4(k + 1)).
Proof of Proposition 11 First note that if the pair (0. h) is such that 
h > 0, then the pair [O',h'). with 0' — 0 + h. and h' = —h. satisfies 
h' < —\0'. I hrst determine (I) which of the possible vectors of threshold 
values maximizes the expected pay-off for a given pair (O.li) and for a 
given ordering of agents (first i, then j). and then (II). taking the optimal 
vectors for every pair, I determine the optimal ordering of agents.
(I) I distinguish the cases (1) h £ ( - 0 , 0). (2) h = - \0 .  (3) h £ 
( —10.0), and (4) h > 0.
(1.1) For h £ (—0,-^0),  there are two vectors of consistent threshold 
values: (0,0,0), and (0,0 + h, — 0 — h). The first gives rise to an expectedQ | ^  Q _ ^
pay-off of Ad—— , whereas the second yields A'i———. The latter is 40 ' 40
clearly the largest of the two. Hence,
E{U\h £ ( -0 ,-^ 0 ) )  =
(1.2) For h = —10, only (0,0,0) is a consistent vector, giving rise to a 
pay-off equal to
£ (n |h  = - i 0 )  = A ^
(1.3) For h £ ( - |0 ,0 ) , both (0, |0 , —10) and (0,0,0) are consisent vectors. 
I split this case up in (a) h £ ( —|0,O) and (b) h £ (0.0). The case of 
h = 0 can be left unstudied as it implies identical agents.
(I.3.a) That the vector (0, —10, |0) leads to the highest profit can easily 
be seen. Hence
E (U \h£(-~ 0 ,0 ))  =
02 + 4 Oh + 2 h2 
' 1 8 0(0 +  0 )
(I.3.b) (0, |0, — \0) maximizes the expected pay off. Therefore 




























































































(1.4) For h > 0, there are four different vectors of consistent threshold 
values, three of which lead to the same expected pay off:
(0,O.O),(0,O.-0- 0), and ( -0 .0 +  0.0)
to an expected profit equal to A']——— —, which is the larger of the two
8(# -j- h )
profit expressions. Therefore
(II) I follow the same division as in (I).
(II.1) Suppose h £ (—0, —10), and therefore h' > 9'. E(U\0(i,j)) =
Clearly, for the interval under consideration, E(H\0(j, i)) > £"(FI|O(/. j))\ 
the person with the smallest variance should be the first.
(II.2) Suppose h = —|0, and so h' = O'. Therefore A’i pr = E{H\0(j,i)) > 
E(U\0(i,j)) =  A'ji, and thus the person with the smallest variance should 
be the first.
which implies that the agent with the smallest variance should be the first. 
(II.3.b) For h £ (0,(9). and hence h' £ (-10'. 0).
while
3(0 + h) -  4h 30 -  h 
~ 80 1 80
(II.3.a) For h £ ( — 10,0), and hence h' £ (0,0'),
= m \ o u , i ) )  > E (n \o ( i j ) )  =  a ,
02 + 4 Oh + 2 h2 
80(0 + 0)
30 + 40 
Al  8(0 +  0 )
-  E(Yl\0{i.j)) > E(U\0(j,i)) =



























































































( 11.4a.) For h = 8.  h '  — — f(?'. Therefore.
-V,^6 -  E(U\0(i,j)) > E(U\0(j.i)) =  X l 1-
(II.4.b) h > 8 is equivalent to h' < —
OÛ 1 AU Ü
x ' W T h )  =  =  X ' W T i T )
and therefore, the agent with the smallest variance should be the first to 
analyze the project.
Proof of Proposition 12 This is based on a comparison of equations 
(37), (38), (39), and (40) for a particular vector (8 ,h ,k ), with equations 
(47), (48), (49), and (50).
Proof of Proposition 13 Use the expressions -E(II|S) = A'i^pfry. 
E(U\H) = A '.itT , £(II|P ) = A', â £ ï, and £(H |0) -  A ',^ _ .
Proof of Proposition 14 Use proposition 1, 2, 4. 5, 7. 8. and the profit 
expressions obtained in the proof of 11 to derive the result.
Proof of Proposition 15 The indices take on the following values:
D(S) = - 
D(O) =  A





Proof of Proposition 16 The proof is based on a comparison of the 
following expressions. For h 6 (—0, —f0), D(S)  = D(H) = D(P)
X î^ z jr - ,  and D{0) =  X ^ 9
3 h
8 0 16 8
For h = - \0 ,  D(S) = D(H) = D(P) = Ai&, while D(O) = A, If.
. 2 8 -  6 h
168For h E ( — ̂ 0,0) the indices amount to D(S)  = A
T. 13h2 + 16h0 + 1682 ^  5 (h2 + 4h8 + 402)
A i------------------------, D( P)  = A i—̂ 1
. D(H)
D(0)  = Ar
120






























































































0 + -III 1302 + 1600 + 1602
For 0 G (0.(9). D(5) = A ,— — —. D(H)  = Ar
D(P) — A'
_ 5 (V +  4/j6> +  402)
726»
8(0 + h)
. a „ lD ( 0 )  = . V , ^ ± ^ .
726»
For h > the indices become -D(S) = D(H) — D(P)  = A)
while D (0 ) equals A bO + 8 0 116 (0 + 0)'
e +  i k  
8(0 + /o '
Proof of Proposition 17 The proof is based on the following expressions
for the expected profit of an omniarchy.
, „ . , 1 0 - f t  3 0 - / i ,  1 ,5 0 - 3 / ivFor h G (-0 , - j0 ) ,  A !—( —;—  H---- ^ —) = A t—(---------).2' 40 80 16 0
For 0 = —|0. the expression for the omniarchy becomes A j^-.O—
For h G ( — 10.0), the expression amounts to X\
. 1 402 + 60h + 02
For 0 G (0, |0), it boils down to A”i
16 0(0 + 0) 
1 402 + 200 -  02
16 0(0 + 0)
For 0 = 0. performance equals A’i —.
u -
And for h > 0 it becomes A'i 1 50 + 40 16 0 + 0
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